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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is based on Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j), as amended, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in 
determining that 90 days was a "reasonable time" within which to 
measure Appellee Robbins1 damages, especially when there was a 
bond, the conversion was willful and knowing, and Appellants' 
admitted "lulling" of Mrs. Robbins continued uninterrupted beyond 
such 90 days. In other words, whether it is "reasonable" for the 
Appellants to allegedly investigate Mrs. Robbins' claim beyond 90 
days yet, at the same time, it is not "reasonable" to measure 
Mrs. Robbins' damages under the Appellants' own standards. 
(a) Standard of Review. The standard of review is 
simply whether the lower court abused its discretion in assessing 
$l-5/16ths per share as Mrs. Robbins' damages. See_ p. 13, bott., 
p. 14 of Appellants' brief in which it is admitted that such 
determination is within the trial court's sound discretion 
(citing Mullen v. J.J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 87 N.E. 1078, 
1080 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1909); Fulley v. Wasserman, 319 
Pa. 420, 179 A. 595, 598-599 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1935); Pacific 
Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 
1948)). See also 40 ALR 1285. 
2. Based on Mrs. Robbins' one-third/two-thirds 
contingency fee agreement with her counsel, whether the lower 
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f court abused its discretion in awarding her additional damages of 
one-third (l/3rd) of her partial summary judgment as reasonable 
/^Attorney's fees. (Ex. 2 hereto; R. 818-823.) Saying it another 
way, in an effort to make Mrs. Robbins whole, whether the lower 
court was justified in determining that what Mrs. Robbins is 
required to pay her attorney constitutes additional damage. As 
set forth below, the issue is not whether the lower court awarded 
Mrs. Robbins attorney's fees as sanctions because it never did. 
This is clear from the record. Further, because the attorney's 
fees issue as stated by Appellants was never asserted in the 
lower court, it is not properly before this Court on appeal. 
(a). There is no review, thus, no standard of review, 
for an issue raised on appeal for the first time. Bangerter 
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative Constitutional provisions 
relative to the Old Republic, Atlas, and Check Rite's separate 
appeal. This is not to ignore that relative to Mrs. Robbins' own 
cross-appeal, various "determinative Constitutional provisions" 
are identified. See p. 2 of Mrs. Robbins' brief dated August 27, 
1991. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the proceedings. This appeal singularly 
involves the proper measure of damages for conversion of a 
chattel having a fluctuating value, in this case, the publicly-
-2-
held securities of Appellant Check Rite. As a result of the 
lower court's determination that Mrs. Robbins was entitled to 
damages of $l-5/16ths per share, Mrs. Robbins obtained summary 
judgment on Counts I and II of her amended complaint, claims for 
wrongful refusal to transfer securities and conversion. See 
Exhibit "A" to Mrs. Robbins' cross-appeal brief; R. 69-114. 
(b) Course of' pjsoGeed-ings-^ nd disposition below. The 
parties acknowledged Atlas and Check Rite1^ liability on Counts I 
and II and submitted the issue of measuring Mrs. Robbins1 damages 
to the lower court. (See the parties' memorandums in support of 
their respective cross-motions for partial summary judgment; R. 
310-326 and R. 351-378.) The lower court made such determination 
and granted Appellee Robbins partial summary judgment. Exhibit 1 
hereto; R. 710-712. 
Mrs. Robbins was further awarded a separate judgment for 
attorney's fees. Exhibit 2 hereto; R. 818-823. This 
determination was based on the contingency fee arrangement 
Mrs. Robbins has with her counsel. See Exhibit 2 hereto. 
Appellants Old Republic, Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite then 
obtained Rule 54(b) certification to appeal the two judgments. 
(R. 842-844.) This appeal, including Mrs. Robbins' separate 
cross-appeal relative to the dismissal of Counts III, IV, and v 
of her amended complaint, has ensued. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
In the interests of non-duplication, Mrs. Robbins 
incorporates by reference her statement of Relevant Facts 
contained on pp. 3-11 of her cross-appeal brief on file herein 
dated August 27, 1991. All that Mrs. Robbins can add is that her 
damages on Counts I and II were established by her own 
affidavits, the affidavits of Chuck Burton, Penny Grace, Potter 
Investment Company and Ernest Muth, each of which is attached 
hereto respectively as Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (R. 389-392, 
413-416, 379-380, 387-388, 381-383, 384-386). Such affidavits 
were unrebutted by Old Republic, Atlas, and Check Rite. In 
addition, since Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite could not 
rebut Mrs. Robbins' supporting affidavits, they resorted to the 
tactic of moving the lower court for an order striking such 
affidavits. (R. 426-427.) At the same time, Old Republic, Atlas 
and Check Rite failed to explain why such affidavits should be 
stricken, leaving it to the lower court to ferret such out on its 
own. (See R. 428-431, Appellants' supporting memorandum and 
R. 576-578, Mrs. Robbins1 opposing memorandum.) Regardless, the 
lower court denied Appellants' motion to strike. (Exhibit 1 
hereto; R. 710-712, 13, p. 2 thereof.) 
Lastly, however, the Appellants, in a last ditch effort 
to defeat Mrs. Robbins' motion for partial summary judgment, 
filed, on March 5, 1990, a tardy opposing affidavit of Paul S. 
Guardalabene (R. 518-523). There is no dispute that such 
- 4 -
affidavit was "untimely" under Rule 4-501(1)(b), Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration.1 Accordingly, Mrs. Robbins made a 
motion to strike such affidavit, a motion the lower court 
apparently found unnecessary to rule upon. (R. 583-589, p. 4 
thereof.) 
Regardless of its inability to assist the Appellants, 
the Guardalabene affidavit ironically supports the lower court's 
ruling. This is because if Guardalabene (i.e., Old Republic) 
acted "reasonably" in investigating the matter for over 90 
days — something to which he attests — the "reasonable time" 
within which to measure Mrs. Robbins' damages must necessarily be 
just as long. Simply put, in investigating her claim, one 
certainly cannot expect Mrs. Robbins to have acted more 
"reasonably" than the very entities upon whom the claim is made. 
Based on the foregoing, the lower court properly held 
that Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite can't have their cake and 
eat it too. That is to say, Appellants cannot maintain that it 
is perfectly "reasonable" for Guardalabene to take over 90 days 
1
 Not only was the Guardalabene affidavit filed late under Rule 4-501 (1)(b) but 
the exhibits thereto were separately filed over two months later on May 24, 1990. See R. 
651-691. Nonetheless, the Guardalabene affidavit, which is meaningless at best, created no 
genuine issue of material fact necessary to defeat summary judgment on the issue of 
damages or otherwise. Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 762 P.2d 
1084, 1087-88 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1988); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 105 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, 772 P.2d 693, 695 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 138 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 9, 795 P.2d 1127 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1990)(statements in an affidavit not contradicted 
by the other parties must be accepted as uncontested facts for purposes of summary 
judgment). 
- 5 -
investigating Mrs, Robbins1 claim, but Mrs. Robbins cannot have 
the same leeway in measuring her damages. 
Relying upon Mrs. Robbins1 several unrebutted supporting 
affidavits, the lower court held that approximately one week less 
than 90 days after May 4, 1989, was a "reasonable time11 within 
which to measure Mrs. Robbins1 damages. Because the unrebutted 
evidence of the highest price of Check Rite stock during that 
period was $l-5/16ths per share, the lower court awarded Mrs. 
Robbins a money judgment on that basis. (Ex. 1 hereto; 
R. 710-712.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite contend 
that the lower court erred in determining that $l-5/16ths per 
share is the proper measure of Mrs. Robbins1 damages. At the 
same time, it is undisputed that this figure is the highest price 
Check Rite stock attained within 90 days after May 4, 1988, the 
date of Atlas1 letter to Mrs. Robbins announcing that it was 
keeping her stock certificate. See Exhibit "J" to Mrs. Robbins1 
amended complaint. As set forth below, there are several 
recognized ways of measuring damages for conversion of chattels 
having a fluctuating value, any one of which results in the same 
conclusion: in this case, $l-5/16ths per share is proper. See 
Brougham v. Swarva, 661 P.2d 138, 143-44 (Wash. App. 
1983)(listing the various recognized ways of measuring damages 
for conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value). 
-6-
Appellants argue that the so-called "New York Rule" 
exclusively applies to this case and that, under such rule, 90 
days after May 4, 1988, is not a "reasonable time." Yet as 
admitted in Appellants' brief, the "reasonable time" rule is 
designed to give the injured party the time and opportunity to 
determine what to do. Appellants1 brief, p. 11. In this case, 
the very admitted and undisputed conduct of Old Republic (i.e., 
Guardalabene) justified extending any shorter "reasonable time" 
simply because Guardalabene himself investigated the matter for 
well over 90 days. In fact, Guardalabene never did complete his 
investigation. Further, Mrs. Robbins was told that she didn't 
have to do anything during the 90 day period other than 
apparently wait for Guardalabene to complete his investigation. 
See Mrs. Robbins1 affidavits, Exhibits 3 and 4 hereto. Thus, the 
Appellants are barred by their very own conduct from arguing that 
a "reasonable time" should be any less than 90 days.2 
In addition, it would be against public policy to assess 
a "reasonable time" in this case at any less than 90 days. This 
is because it would encourage those like Old Republic, Atlas and 
Check Rite to purposely stall claimants for a period beyond 10 or 
30 days in order to make the very arguments they are now making 
z
 Saying it another way, how can over 90 days be "reasonable" for professionals 
like Appellants but less than 90 days is not "reasonable" for a lay person like Mrs. Robbins? 
If one puts oneself in Mrs. Robbins' shoes, how should she have acted differently? 
Furthermore, in deferring to Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite, the converters, are stuck 
with the consequences of Old Republic's action (or inaction). 
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before this Court. The law must be flexible and attentive to the 
nuances of each case: a "reasonable time" depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case and in this case, 90 days, the 
time period during which Guardalabene (Old Republic) negotiated 
directly and continuously with Mrs. Robbins in bad faith, is 
"reasonable."3 If 90 days is not a "reasonable time" based on 
the existence of a bond and the undisputed conduct of 
Guardalabene and Atlas, then insurance companies and their 
obligees can merely delay the resolution of a similar bond claim 
beyond a shorter "reasonable time" in every instance, thus, 
hoping that claimants like Mrs. Robbins will eventually get 
tired, disappear, or otherwise compromise themselves.4 
Appellants1 willful, knowing and ignoble conduct is 
wrong and it should not be rewarded. Brougham v. Swarva supra at 
p. 144. On the contrary, all the Appellants had to do was go in 
the market and buy Mrs. Robbins 8,000 shares of replacement stock 
when she first made her claim. This is not to ignore that by 
virtue of the bond, Mrs. Robbins had no independent duty to 
somehow hurry and mitigate her damages as contemplated in the 
3
 See Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, 309 F.Supp. 548, 565 (D.C. Utah 
1970)("What a 'reasonable time' may be will vary from case to case."). 
4
 No doubt that had the price of the stock stayed the same after the conversion 
and then started to increase substantially in price after 90 days, Appellants would 
themselves be arguing before this Court that 90 days is a "reasonable time." Thus, had it 
benefited them, and, based on Guardalabene's alleged inability to "get to the bottom" of the 
matter within at least 90 days, the Appellants would surely be arguing that 90 days is a 
"reasonable time" within which to measure the damages in this case. 
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various "New York Rule" cases exclusively relied upon by 
Appellants, particularly when it is undisputed that no one told 
her to do so. 
Finally, respecting the issue of attorney's fees, the 
lower court awarded attorney's fees as part of Mrs. Robbinsf 
partial summary judgment damages. This is evidenced by the very 
language of such judgment and the exhibits attached to it and 
incorporated by reference. See Exhibit 2; R. 818-823. The same 
is further evidenced by the lower court having ordered Mrs. 
Robbins to divulge her agreement with counsel — after the 
partial summary judgment award. (R. 800-801, Minute Entry.) 
There is simply no evidence in the record that the lower court 
awarded attorney's fees as sanctions. To be sure, Mrs. Robbins 
never argued that she was entitled to attorney's fees on that 
basis (R. 351-378, p. 22 thereof and R. 754-778).5 At the same 
time, the Appellants never argued that Mrs. Robbins wasn't 
entitled to attorney's fees because the same is tantamount to 
sanctions (R. 439-449). Moreover, after arguing over what the 
attorney's fees should be and, after discovering Mrs. Robbins' 
agreement with counsel, the parties in effect stipulated to the 
5
 In support of the court's award of attorney's fees, Mrs. Robbins attached a 
complete copy of South San Pitch Company v. Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45, 765 P.2d 
1279 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1988). See R. 775-778. In South San Pitch, the Court of Appeals held 
that attorney's fees can, under certain limited circumstances, be awarded as an element of 
a party's damages. 
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amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.6 Furthermore, the lower 
court specifically denied a separate motion made by Mrs. Robbins 
for sanctions. (Ex. 1 hereto; R. 710-712, 16 thereof.) Thus, 
the argument that attorneyfs fees were awarded as "sanctions'" is 
frivolous. The same is also raised on appeal for the first time. 
Accordingly, this issue, as argued by Appellants on pp. 21-24 of 
their brief, cannot be considered. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, 
Inc., 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21, P.2d (Ut. Ct. of App., 
August 14, 1991)(failure to raise issues below precludes raising 
them on appeal); Bangerter v. Poulton, supra at 102.7 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING 
THAT $l-5/16ths PER SHARE IS MRS. ROBBINS" DAMAGES. 
The only issue before this Court — an issue the parties 
could not agree on — is the proper measure of damages for 
conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value. Specifically, 
what is the appropriate measure of damages for the intentional, 
6
 The record evidences that Mrs. Robbins initially sought $10,000 in attorney's 
fees. (Exhibit 3 hereto, *3 , p. 2 bott., R. 390; R. 351-378, p. 22 thereof; R. 754-778.) When 
the Appellants disputed such amount and were able — with the lower court's assistance — 
to discover Mrs. Robbins' agreement with her counsel (R. 800-801), the parties agreed in 
open court that one-third of the partial summary judgment or some-$4,000 was the proper 
amount to be awarded. This is because, based on Mrs. Robbins' agreement with counsel, 
Exhibit "A" to Exhibit 2 hereto, Mrs. Robbins would not be out-of-pocket any more than 
one-third of the partial summary judgment or approximately $4,000. 
7
 See also R. 782-789, pp. 3-6 therein, Defendants' Objection and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Award of Attorney's Fees in which Appellants admit that Mrs. 
Robbins is entitled to attorney's fees for prevailing on Counts I and II. 
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knowing and willful conversion of and wrongful refusal to 
transfer Mrs, Robbins1 8,000 shares of of Check Rite stock? 
Jurisdictions are split on the measure of damages for 
conversion of property having a fluctuating value. Brougham 
supra at p. 144. There is an even greater split depending upon 
whether the conversion was willful and knowing. Id. Ironically, 
however, using any one of the several recognized ways of 
measuring the damages in this case, the result is the same: the 
appropriate amount is $l-5/16ths per share. Thus, any way one 
cares to look at it, the lower court was correct. 
A. One recognized measure of damages is the highest 
price of the stock between the date of conversion and the date of 
trial. According to the undisputed facts, such is $l-5/16ths per 
share and therefore, the lower court was correct. 
Reference is made to 40 ALR 1282 which discusses damages 
for conversion of property having a fluctuating value. In 
Bennett v. Tucker & Pennington, 20 Ga. App. 288, 123 S.E. 165, 
166 (Ga. Ct. of App. 1924), the court recognized the right to 
recover in trover the highest value between the date of 
conversion and trial. In this case, Mrs. Robbins1 stock was not 
converted in good faith. The conversion was intentional or as 
the result of culpable negligence. To be sure, by virtue of the 
bond, there is no excuse for either Defendant Atlas or Check Rite 
not going into the market and immediately buying Mrs. Robbins 
replacement stock. It is further undisputed that Defendants 
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Atlas, Check Rite, and Old Republic had notice that the stock was 
proceeding to increase in price up to and through the beginning 
of August, 1988. (See Ex. 7 hereto, Affidavit of Potter 
Investment Company and Exhibit "L" to Mrs. Robbins* amended 
complaint.) 
Unlike cases relied upon by the Old Republic, Atlas and 
Check Rite — cases which do not involve a bond — this is not, 
by any means, a case of innocent or inadvertent conversion and 
therefore, the foregoing measure of damages applies. Cases 
further hold that if a trespass is willful, fraudulent, or under 
circumstances imputing negligence to the trespasser, thus showing 
that he is indifferent to the rights of others, and in cases of 
property of a fluctuating value, the plaintiff, at his option, 
may sue and recover upon the basis of the highest intermediate 
value to the date of trial. Burmarsal Company, Inc. v. Lake, 272 
S.W. 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).8 
Based on the theory of continuing conversion, the 
measure of damages would include a time period up to and until at 
8
 There is but one occasional difficulty with this measure, and it occurs only if 
the property, after a long time, is still in the possession of the defendant. In Ingram 
v. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 32 Am. Rep. 762, 2 N.W. 755, 764 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1879), the court 
stated that in those cases where the market value is very fluctuating, great injustice would 
be done by this rule to the man who honestly converted such property, in the belief that it 
was his own, if, after the lapse of five or six years, he should be called upon to pay the 
highest market value it had obtained during that extended time. Such is not the case here 
because in this case we are talking about a time period of less than ninety (90) days after 
the willful and knowing conversion, a time period in which Appellants disingenuously claim 
that they — not Mrs. Robbins ~ didn't know what to do. Further, there is no dispute that 
Appellants did not convert the property "in the honest belief that it was their own." Id. 
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least the first part of August, 1988.9 The theory of continuing 
conversion occurs only in cases in which the property remains in 
the possession of the defendant subsequent to the conversion. 
This is because in the event the wrongdoer has parted with 
property to another person, the conversion ceases and passes to 
that next person. In this case, Defendant Atlas still maintains 
possession of Certificate 258 and it has refused to issue and 
deliver Mrs. Robbins a replacement certificate. In doing 
absolutely nothing and in further shirking its responsibilities 
by misdirecting Mrs. Robbins to Old Republic, Defendant Atlas has 
also profited from its own wrongdoing.10 
In Devlin v. Pike, (N.Y. 1874) 5 Daly (New York Common 
Pleas Reports) 85, the court stated that if the property at the 
time of trial is of greater value than it was at the time of the 
conversion, and the defendant is still in possession of it, the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover its increased value at the time 
of trial. In Gowan v. Wisconsin-Alabama Lumber Co., 215 
Ala. 231, 110 S. 31, 33 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1926), an instruction was 
approved that, if the jury believed that the timber converted had 
a fluctuating value, they were authorized to find for the 
y
 For a list of authority that the measure of damages is the highest price 
between the date of conversion and the time of trial, see 48 ALR 1301. See also 87 ALR 
818, a supplement to 40 ALR 1282. 
1 0
 In fact, to date, Defendants Atlas and Check Rite are out-of-pocket 
nothing. This is because under the terms of the open penalty indemnity bond subject of this 
case, Old Republic has been paying all their attorney's fees. 
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plaintiff for the highest value as shown by the evidence, with 
interest from the date of conversion. Accord: Young v. Corbitt 
Motor Truck Company, 148 S.C. 511, 146 S.E. 534, 544 
(Sup. Ct. S.C, 1929) (damages are highest value up to the time of 
trial with interest thereon). 
There is no dispute that the highest price the stock 
reached between the alleged date of conversion and today (i.e., a 
date prior to any prospective trial) is one dollar and five-
sixteenths cents ($l-5/16ths) per share. Accordingly, the lower 
court's judgment, which embraces this amount, is correct. 
B. Another recognized measure of damages is the highest 
price of the stock between the date of conversion and notice of 
conversion, on the one hand, and a "reasonable time" afterwards, 
on the other. Because July end/August beginning 1988 is a 
"reasonable time1' after mid-May 1988, the lower court's award of 
$l-5/16ths per share is correct. 
In Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated 
Mining Co. of Utah, 192 P. 664, 672 (1920), this Court applied 
the so-called "New York Rule."11 See also Nephi Processing Plant 
1 1
 Mrs. Robbins submits that a strict application of the New York Rule may be 
inapplicable to this case. Such rule grew out of New York Stock Exchange cases involving 
conversion of customers' securities as in the cases cited by Appellants. Such is inapplicable 
to the facts of this case because, not being a customer and the transaction not involving a 
sale in the market, Mrs. Robbins was not required to deliver stock to anyone else. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Robbins was not under any extraordinary duty or other urgency to 
mitigate her own damages as in situations where the converted securities must be delivered 
in short order to a third party. Most importantly, however, the cases cited by Appellants do 
not involve the existence of an open penalty indemnity bond, a fact which excuses Mrs. 
Robbins from being required to do anything other than what she did. 
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v. Talbott, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957). Under the "New York 
Rule," damages are the highest price of the converted property 
within a "reasonable time" after the owner has notice of the 
conversion. According to 161 ALR 323, there is no guide under 
the New York Rule as to what is a "reasonable time."12 In Mullen 
v. J.J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 24 LRA (N.S.) 511, 87 
N.E. 1078, 1080 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1909), the court held 
that where the action was for conversion of stock shares and for 
a quantity of wheat, the prices for which, it was alleged, had 
increased after the conversion, damages for the conversion would 
be based on the highest market value within two (2) months of the 
conversion, if such time, under all of the circumstances of the 
case was a reasonable one.13 In Scott v. Rogers, (1864) 31 
N.Y. 676, the court held that four (4) months after the 
conversion was a reasonable time. In Scott, quoted at 40 ALR 
1285, the court stated: 
. . . If it be clear upon the evidence that an 
immediate or speedy sale were contemplated, I 
think such a fact would contract the limits of 
this reasonable period. If it were clear that 
months were expected to intervene before a 
sale should take place, I see no objection to 
extending this reasonable period to a similar 
length. If the evidence reflected no light on 
the subject, then a reasonable period would 
probably be a question of law. . . . 
1 2
 See footnote 3 above citing Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. 
1 3
 Therein, the trial court was authorized to determine as a question of law 
what constituted a "reasonable time." Mullen at 87 N.E. 1080. See Standard of Review 
subsection under Statement of Issues above. 
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In May 1988, the market price of Check Rite stock was low and no 
sale was either imminent or contemplated as Mrs. Robbins had not 
sold her 8,000 shares "short" into the market or to any third 
party. Under the "New York Rule," Mrs. Robbins is entitled to 
receive damages of the highest market price which that kind of 
merchandise may have reached between the time of conversion and a 
reasonable time within which to replace it or bring an action. 
[Emphasis added.] In this case, it wasn't reasonable for 
Mrs. Robbins to have replaced such stock on her own prior to July 
end/August beginning 1988, because she understood and was 
repeatedly informed by Old Republic that, because of the bond, 
her predicament would be taken care of. See Exhibits 3 and 4 
hereto. Is there some reason she shouldn't have believed them? 
Furthermore, Mrs. Robbins didn't have the available 
resources to effect "cover" even if someone had instructed her 
accordingly, which no one did. See Ex. 3 hereto, 16, p. 3 
thereof. As early as mid-July, Old Republic informed 
Mrs. Robbins that it was investigating the matter and based on 
such representations, it would have been totally unreasonable for 
her to have disbelieved Old Republic and gone around it by filing 
suit or attempting to solve the problem some other way. This is 
undisputed. 
Ninety (90) days after the alleged date of the 
conversion in this case is a "reasonable time" as a matter of 
law. Brougham v. Swarva, supra at p. 144; Gragard's Succession, 
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106 La. 298, 30 S. 885, 888 (Sup. Ct. La. 1901)(in determining 
damages for conversion of chattels having a fluctuating value, 
the owner should be given the benefit of the better price which 
prevailed within a few months after the conversion). 
Because there was a bond, and, as a result, Mrs. Robbins 
was in continuous negotiations with Old Republic, she was not 
under a duty to do anything other than what Old Republic was 
telling her. If she had an additional duty of some kind, what is 
the basis of such? She had not sold Certificate 258 and didn't 
need to deliver 8,000 shares to anyone else. Any such duty to 
"cover," mitigate or replace one's own property is based on the 
defendant having sold the converted goods and, at the same time, 
the plaintiff has an obligation to deliver the same to a third 
party. Such is not at issue here. Certificate 258 had not been 
sold by Atlas, Check Rite — or even Mrs. Robbins herself — to 
someone else. Thus, Mrs. Robbins did not simultaneously owe 
8,000 shares to a third party. Based on Old Republic's bond and 
the willful and knowing conduct of Old Republic, Atlas, and Check 
Rite, Mrs. Robbins acted reasonably. Brougham supra at p. 144 
("The innocent victim should not suffer a loss because of the 
wrongful taking and withholding of his property.") 
In sum, a "reasonable time" period after the conversion 
and notice of conversion should be either tolled or extended to 
at least 90 days because of the intentional — if not plain 
reckless — "lulling" and stalling activity of Old Republic, 
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Atlas, and Check Rite. Because slightly less than ninety (90) 
days is a "reasonable time" in this case under the "New York 
Rule," the lower court's judgment in Mrs. Robbins• favor is 
correct.14 
C. Another recognized measure of damages applicable in 
this case is the highest price of the chattel between the time of 
conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter for commencing an 
action. Mrs. Robbins commenced her action with reasonable 
diligence and because the highest price of the stock in that 
interim was $l-5/16ths per share, the lower court's judgment is 
correct. 
In Hamer v. Hathoway, (1867) 33 Cal. 117, an action for 
conversion of hay, the case was remanded for directions to enter 
judgment for the plaintiff for the sum which constituted the 
maximum value of the hay between the time of conversion and the 
beginning of an action.15 This measure is supported by the more 
1 4
 The Appellants rely on Western Securities, supra for the proposition that 30 
days is a "reasonable time" in this case. However, such proposition does not follow from 
Western Securities. Western Securities involved the conversion of stock in a pledge 
situation when the pledgor or borrower wanted the particular collateral allegedly converted 
by the lender back in his own possession. In this case, Mrs. Robbins was not a borrower; 
Cert. No. 258 was not collateral on a loan; she didn't even want Cert. No. 258 back: she 
simply wanted 8,000 shares of free-trading stock. Furthermore, in Western Securities, the 
sale of the pledged stock at $1.50 was expressly authorized by the provision of the 
promissory note between the parties and the issue in that case only became one of 
resolving the appropriate price of the stock after a perfectly proper sale thereof — not 
after any alleged conversion. Western Securities supra at p. 673. 
1 5
 The same measure was not followed in the case of Page v. Fowler, (1870) 39 
Cal. 412, 2 Am. Rep. 462, only because the hay price went up ten times the following year 
and trial of the action occurred six years after the time of conversion. 
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recent Reed v. White, Weld & Co., Inc., 571 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1978)(holding that if the conversion is willful, 
fraudulent or attended with gross negligence, the owner may 
recover the highest value between the date of conversion and the 
filing of suit). In this case, there can be no doubt that, at a 
minimum, Defendant Atlas was willful, grossly negligent or 
inexcusably reckless in not only doing nothing, but in directing 
Mrs. Robbins to Old Republic and when it knew very well that it 
and Check Rite, not she, were the obligees on the bond. See also 
Imperial Sugar Co., Inc. v. Torrans, 602 S.W.2d 275, 276-77 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979)(where conversion is attended with fraud, willful 
wrong, or gross negligence and the property converted is of 
changing or fluctuating value, measure of damages is highest 
market value of such property between date of conversion and 
filing of the suit). 
In Hall v. Bache, 235 App. Div. 256, 256 N.Y. Supp. 693, 
695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., App. Div. 1932), it was held that as to 
damages for the conversion of cotton, the plaintiff was limited 
by the highest price reached between the date of the conversion 
and a reasonable time after termination of negotiations between 
the parties respecting a settlement. Accordingly, it was held 
that where the last interview between the plaintiff and the 
defendants1 attorneys respecting settlement was on March 9, such 
reasonable time for the plaintiff's decision expired on March 21 
following. In this case, negotiations between counsel to 
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Mrs. Robbins and counsel to Old Republic (Guardalabene) 
terminated in December, 1988 — months after the stock reached 
its highest price — and Mrs. Robbins brought her action in 
April, 1989. Based on this measure, as with the preceding 
measures, Mrs. Robbins1 measure of damages is still July 
end/August beginning 1988 when Check Rite stock achieved a price 
of one dollar and five sixteenths cents ($l-5/16ths) per share.16 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION NOT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS 
OF MRS. ROBBINS, CHUCK BURTON, PENNY GRACE AND 
POTTER INVESTMENT COMPANY WAS CORRECT. THIS IS 
BECAUSE NO BASIS WAS EVER ASSERTED BY THE APPELLANTS 
AS TO WHY ANY AFFIDAVIT SHOULD BE STRIKEN AND 
NO BASIS EXISTS REGARDLESS. 
Appellants1 lower court motion to strike Mrs. Robbins1 
several affidavits is legal boilerplate wholly lacking in 
substance. No attempt was made to connect any objection to the 
actual text of any such affidavit, thereby indicating to the 
lower court why any affidavit is objectionable. See R. 428-431. 
All the Appellants put forth — without any basis 
whatsoever — is that such affidavits contain "hearsay," "lack 
foundation," or contain "legal conclusions."17 For instance, 
16 According to 40 ALR 1297, it is a question of law whether an action was 
begun and prosecuted with reasonable diligence. At the same time, there can be no dispute 
that Mrs. Robbins did indeed prosecute her action with reasonable diligence and therefore, 
if one were to apply this measure, the lower court's judgment is correct. 
1 7
 Under Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court has ample 
discretion to consider affidavits over objections based on either foundation or the 
competence of the affiants. McCormick §53; Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 45-50 
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Potter Investment Company sold Certificate No. 258 to 
Mrs. Robbins. Certainly it knows whether Mrs. Robbins bought the 
stock from it and whether it alone delivered Certificate No. 258 
to her. Further, the Potter affidavit refers to a conversation 
that Mr. George "John" Potter had with Guardalabene, Old 
Republic's agent and employee. The affidavit says nothing of 
what Guardalabene purportedly said, and surely Mr. Potter is 
competent to testify as to what he talked about or what he said 
to Guardalabene. 
With respect to the Penny Grace affidavit, Ms. Grace, a 
Vice President of the national stock brokerage firm of Thompson 
McKinnon Securities, Inc., certainly has personal knowledge of 
the price at which she personally sold Check Rite stock to her 
own customers. What could possibly be objectionable about 
that? The same is true with respect to the Chuck Burton 
affidavit: he knows what he said to Mrs. Robbins and he knows 
the price at which his firm, Fitzgerald, Talman, sold Check Rite 
stock at July end/August beginning 1988. How could Mr. Burton 
not have personal knowledge of that contained in his affidavit as 
well? Further, since the Burton affidavit attests to a lower 
price than that of Thompson McKinnon (Penny Grace), the Burton 
(1962). See Federal Rule of Evidence 104. See also Advisory Committee's Note to 
Subsection (a), Rule 104, Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 196. Furthermore, the 
lower court, in considering Mrs. Robbins1 various affidavits, clearly did not consider the 
weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). Thus, the lower 
court committed no error in this regard. 
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affidavit was primarily submitted by Mrs. Robbins to demonstrate 
that she was indeed closely following the price of Check Rite 
stock and that had she had a certificate to deliver at July 
end/August beginning 1988, she would have sold it. 
The foregoing is also true of Mrs. Robbins1 two 
affidavits, Exhibits 3 and 4 hereto. There can be little dispute 
that she is competent to attest to that contained in both such 
affidavits and that neither contain hearsay. 
Mrs. Robbins1 several affidavits submitted in support of 
her motion for partial summary judgment, Exhibits 3-8 hereto, are 
not in the least objectionable. Arnica Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 768 P.2d 950, 963-64 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989)(is proper for lower court to assess damages 
on the basis of affidavits); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1983)(affidavit in support of summary judgment must set 
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence).18 Because 
Mrs. Robbins1 several supporting affidavits each contain facts 
which would be admissible in evidence, the lower court committed 
no error in considering them. 
1 8
 See also generally D & L Supply v. Saurini, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 775 P.2d 
420, 421 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1989); Bruno v. Plateau Mining Company, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 747 
P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1192 (Utah 1983). In 
addition, recent Utah authority holds that where a party's motion for summary judgment is 
challenged by a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavits, the movant should be 
given an opportunity to supplement his affidavit to meet the standards of Rule 56(e) before 
the summary judgment motion is ruled upon. Gillmor v. Cummings, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 
17, 806 P.2d 1205 (Ut. Ct. of App. 1991). 
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POINT III 
A LOWER COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ISSUE FINDINGS 
IN ORDER TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. FURTHER, THE ATTORNEY'S FEE ISSUE, BEING 
RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, SHOULD BE IGNORED. 
A trial court is not required to issue findings in 
awarding summary judgment because it defeats the purpose of 
summary judgment. Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 166 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13, 14, P.2d (Ut. Sup. Ct., August 2, 1991). 
Naturally, this principle embraces an award of attorneyfs fees on 
summary judgment. Nonetheless, in an ignoble attempt to get this 
Court to review the lower court's award of attorney's fees, 
Appellants argue for the first time that the lower court awarded 
attorney's fees as "sanctions."19 This is not true. The lower 
court based its award of attorney's fees on South San Pitch 
Company v. Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45, 765 P.2d 1279 
(Ut. Ct. of App. 1988) and Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc. v. Talbot, 247 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957), the latter of 
which Appellants themselves ironically rely upon. See p. 12-13, 
Appellants' brief. Nephi holds that a plaintiff victimized by 
conversion is entitled to lost profits, including the cost of 
minimizing damages. Nephi at p. 77 3-774. This would include 
1 9
 In other words, by arguing for the first time that the attorney's fees 
awarded are "sanctions", the Appellants are relying on recent case law holding that the 
lower court must make a specific finding as to the basis thereof. In this case, the lower 
court not only did not award attorney's fees as sanctions but it specifically denied Mrs. 
Robbins' motion for sanctions. (Exhibit 1 hereto; R. 710-712,116 thereof.) Thus, there is no 
reason why the lower court should have issued findings as to the basis of attorney's fees it 
did not award as "sanctions." 
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attorney's fees necessarily incurred to be made whole. As 
further contemplated in Nephi such losses are within the 
contemplation of the parties to this appeal because Mrs. Robbins 
had already made her claim and the Appellants knew that the price 
of Check Rite stock was on the rise. See Exhibit "L" to amended 
complaint; see also Potter affidavit. 
The contention that the lower court awarded attorney's 
fees as "sanctions" is frivolous and wholly unsupported by the 
record. See Ex. 2 hereto. Because Appellants have manufactured 
this issue for purposes of appeal, it should be ignored. Olson 
v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21, P.2d 
(Ut. Ct. of App., August 14, 1991)(failure to raise issues 
below precludes raising them on appeal); accord: Bangerter 
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
The conversion in this case is willful and knowing, if 
not fraudulent, particularly when a bond existed solely to 
prevent such a conversion. Old Republic, Atlas and Check Rite 
provide no explanation as to why the "reasonable time" in this 
case —assuming one applies the New York Rule — should be any 
less than 90 days. In fact, their figure of 30 days could not be 
more arbitrary and "unreasonable." Old Republic, Atlas and Check 
Rite have simply picked 30 days "out of thin air" because it is 
the longest time period after May 4, 1988 before the price of 
Check Rite stock started to rise. Thus, 30 days is only 
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"reasonable" because it is economical to them. The New York Rule 
is not designed to economically assist the converter. 
Based on the foregoing, the lower court's partial 
summary judgment in Mrs. Robbins1 favor should be left intact and 
undisturbed. 
DATED this 3rd day of October. 1991. 
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In re: LeAnna (Broadwater) Robbins v. Old Republic Surety, et 
al., Case No. 900508 
Appellee (Broadwater) Robbins' Opposing Brief, 
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Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
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Larry G. Reed, Esq. 
CROWTHER & REED 
Attorneys for Defendant Atlas 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip R. Hughes, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Check Rite 
884 South 200 East, Suite 100 
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EXHIBIT "1" 
Th-cd Jotltcisi District 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 Byr..,,!* ..uj,—J N-l'&uuiy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f / k / a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1,1990. 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several 
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters 
judgment and further orders as follows: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action is denied. 
- 1 - (W7JL0 
2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended 
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of 
$10,500.00 with interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31, 1988. Pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further, 
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date 
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken 
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in 
support of such an award. 
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an 
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and 
Penny Grace is denied. 
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike 
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial 
summary judgment is granted. 
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her 
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied. 
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants 
and their counsel is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. 
DATED this (y* day of June, 1990. 
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In re: Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al. 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
0200:JUDG.l 
Third District Court 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
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EXHIBIT "2" 
RLEBLV-* ' * , -; 
Third J_<,; ,..,..
 t CsUict 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL.DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah, ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
A hearing having been held in the above-entitled Court on September 6, 1990, 
at the hour of 9:30 a.m., on the issue of attorney's fees; John Michael Coombs having 
appeared for plaintiff Broadwater; Stephen J. Trayner having appeared on behalf of 
defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National Insurance Company of 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Larry G. Reed having appeared for defendant Atlas Stock Transfer; 
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D^^wiiy Clerk 
no appearance having been made by defendant Check Rite International, Inc., in that its A 
local counsel claims to have had no notice of the hearing cifiJdftCOi<V$&\ *To\r | P 
Ck&ck KlVe U)C\s A/of f»s/cla»«f <jw+K4 tfUi IIIMCJ ^ ^ + I T * C 4 • £. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the affidavits and 
memorandums on file; it having also heard the parties' oral stipulation that plaintiff is bound 
by the terms of her contingency fee arrangement with her counsel, and, in that regard, the 
Court having further acknowledged that plaintiff has a one-third (1 /3)/two-thirds (2/3's) 
contingency tee arrangement witn her counsel, as sex forth in Exhibit "A1' attached hereto 
and incorporated by reference, and good cause further appearing, the Court ruled as 
follows: 
Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater is hereby awarded a judgment against defendants 
Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., for attorney's fees in the amount of 
one-third (1 /3) of the amount of the judgment entered against such defendants on June 6, 
1990, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated into this 
judgment by reference as Exhibit "B'\ 
yd 
DATED t h i s / 7 Hay~of September, 1990. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Third District Judge (Raymond S. Uno 
Approved as to form: 
Philip R. Hurfhes 
Counsel to Check Rite Intef national. Inc. 
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March 22, 1989 
Mr. John Michael Coombs, Lawyer 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Michael: 
I have searched my telephone records and, apparently, have given 
you all the information on calls I made to Guardalabene. 
I have recieved the most recent offer and find it absolutely ri-
diculous. As you will note, in previous correspondence I sent to 
Guardalabene, dated July 11th, he had proposed over the phone to 
pay me the amount I had paid for the stock for settlement, which 
was $2,480, and I flatly refused and asked that he just simply re-
place the stock and allow me to sell it at whatever price I chose. 
That is why I am so adamant about their paying me the highest price 
the stock traded at plus punitive damages or attorneys fees because 
of their unwillingness to settle the matter with me at that time. 
I'm not sure we want to go into such detail with Fletcher, but you're 
the expert and I will leave that decision up to you. You had men-
tioned previously about asking for a Summary Judgment. What is your 
thinking on that now? 
Below I have outlined our agreement the way I believe we discussed 
it. If it is satisfactory to you, please make a copy, sign it and 
return for my files. 
I have previously submitted a $1,500 retainer to you which is to 
be deducted from your total fees. 
It is' agreed i:hat you are entitled to one third of whatever is re-
covered. However, it is further agreed that if it is necessary to 
go to trial then you will be entitled to half of whatever is re-
covered. Except if punitive damages are awarded, I will be entitled 
to the first $8,000 of whatever is awarded and then we will split 
the remainder on a 50/50 basis. 
lr 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS 
Sinperely, 
V^£ 
c
-^/£&?C><? 
lAnna (Broadwater) Robbins 
G03£Q 
FILED B1STRIST 30c?HT 
Third Judicial District 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
^ UUN 6 1990 
By * u. 
j vOv>pu»y Cltf k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business In 
Utah. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k /a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
The Court having reviewed the file, having heard oral argument on May 1.1990, 
including the memorandums and affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to several 
motions, the Court being fully advised and good cause further appearing, hereby enters 
judgment and further orders as follows: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary Judgment on plaintiff's first and second 
causes of action is denied. 
- 1 - 0C8£i 
2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II of her amended 
complaint is granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants Atlas Stock Transfer and Check Rite International, Inc., in the amount of 
$10,500.00 with Interest thereon at 10% per annum since July 31,1988. Pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff is hereby awarded costs. Further, 
pursuant to §15-1-4, Utah Code Ann., interest shall accrue on this judgment from the date 
of its entry at the rate of 12% per annum. The matter of plaintiff's attorney's fees is taken 
under advisement and will be ruled upon after the submission of a detailed affidavit in 
support of such an award. 
3. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for an 
order striking the affidavits of plaintiff. Chuck Burton, Potter Investment Company, and 
Penny Grace is denied. 
4. Defendant Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion to strike 
certain portions of plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for partial 
summary judgment is granted. 
5. Defendants Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in her 
amended complaint as against them is granted, but any award of attorney's fees is denied. 
6. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the insurance company defendants 
and their counsel is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. 
DATED this (y* day of June, 1990. 
- 2 -
0C822 
In re: Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, et al. 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
0200:JUDG.l 
Third District Court 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
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EXHIBIT "3" 
' • - < i i t 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k /a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 
I AND II OF HER AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in Support of 
her Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint: 
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. 
V. 
M »qn 
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2. That your affiant has carefully read and helped prepare the Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on 
counts I and II of her Amended Complaint and in fact, she personally participated in the 
drafting thereof. That in an effort not to duplicate each of such enumerated Facts as 
detailed therein in this affidavit, your affiant can attest that each and every such Statement 
of Undisputed Fact therein as it pertains to her and her knowledge and experience as to 
how she was mistreated, misled, and "lulled" by certain of the defendants and, as to what 
otherwise transpired in this case, is true and correct in all particulars. 
3. That your affiant can attest that had she had a replacement certificate for 
Certificate 258 at July end/August beginning 1988 she would have sold it. She further 
believes that she would have received the highest price that such stock reached in 1988, 
namely, $1-5/16ths per share, or, at a minimum, at least $1.25 per share. This is because 
your affiant knew of a pending Check Rite merger and she also had a brokerage account 
with Ernest Muth and was daily, if not very closely, following the price of the stock at that 
time. For instance, your affiant would have had an open order placed in which to sell the 
stock at that time. On the other hand, your affiant believes that had she had a replacement 
certificate at such time, she may have well received $1-5/16ths per share as set forth in the 
supporting affidavit of Penny Grace. Thus, your affiant believes that she is entitled to at 
least $10,000 in damages (8.000 shares x $1.25 per share) and perhaps $10,500 in damages 
(8,000 shares x $1-5/16ths per share). Your affiant further believes that she is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the highest legal rate or at a rate of no less that 12% and in her 
Amended Complaint she has indeed asked for pre-judgment interest. Lastly, your affiant 
has incurred attorney fees of at least $10,000 just trying to protect and enforce her rights, 
003SC 
and she believes that such incurred fees have caused her additional damage which would 
not have occured but for the wrongful conduct of the insurance company defendants and 
defendants Atlas and Check Rite. 
4. That your affiant believes that the defendants (with the exception of 
defendant Fletcher) had a duty to make her whole, a duty which included immediately going 
out into the market in May 1988 and buying 8,000 shares of stock to replace Certificate 258 
on which a lost instrument bond had been posted. That the misfortune of this entire case is 
that no responsible entity or person would help your affiant in any way and no one wanted 
to take responsibility for the problem until there was nothing left to do but file a lawsuit — 
and even then, the defendants would rather spend more money litigating this case than 
giving your affiant what she truly deserves. 
5. That your affiant believes that Guardalabene's investigation of the matter 
was exclusively for his own employer and Fletcher, the principal on the bond, and had 
nothing to do with her inasmuch as she is and was a totally innocent victim. That your 
affiant believes that Atlas, Check Rite, and the insurance company defendants have no 
excuse not to have immediately purchased 8,000 shares of replacement stock in May 1988 
and thereafter and immediately delivered the same to her. 
6. That your affiant does not believe that she had an obligation to go out and 
"cover", namely, to go out into the market herself and with her own money buy replacement 
stock for four reasons: (1) the problem was not her fault, (2) no one ever told her to "cover" 
or do anything else at any time, (3) she did not have the resources or cash on hand to have 
so bought replacement stock herself, and (4) she was not "short" the stock herself, namely, 
she had not sold it to or by or through anyone else and therefore she had no duty herself to 
- 3 -
deliver 8,000 shares of replacement stock to any third party. That your affiant believes that 
had she been "short" 8,000 shares herself then she arguably would have had a duty to 
"cover", but under the circumstances of this case, she did not. That if anyone involved in 
the case had simply informed your affiant that your affiant should have "covered" — just to 
avoid this lawsuit your affiant would have done so. Unfortunately, no one did and your 
affiant had no reason to think she was acting other than as reasonably as could be 
expected of anyone. 
7. That your affiant has incurred additional damages of substantial 
unwarranted attorney fees, costs, including out-of-pocket expenses, and time expended 
and she believes that she is entitled to such additional damages on which there should be an 
evidentiary hearing. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this^day of February, 1990. 
££^J^^^^ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi 
My Commission Expires: 
Broadwater) Plaintiff 
Febrwtary^ggQ 
tJjJlji 
at Salt Lake City, UT 
B:AFDVT.8 
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EXHIBIT "4" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS* 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
LeAnna Broadwater, on her oath, deposes and says as follows in opposition to 
certain defendants' February 6. 1990. motion for partial summary judgment on Counts I and 
II of her amended complaint: 
c ^ J w S f y * ^ 
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<3f4i3 
1. That your affiant is the sole plaintiff in the above-matter and she has 
personal knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. That your affiant 
incorporates by reference her affidavit filed in support of her cross-motion for summary 
judgment on Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint. 
2. That your affiant disputes the defendants' calculation of a "reasonable time" 
as set forth in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
That your affiant believes that she could not have acted more reasonably under the facts 
and circumstances of this case and she believes that defendants Atlas, Check Rite, 
Northwestern National, and Old Republic did not. That in fact, none of the responsible 
parties would assist her or do anything to resolve the problem and in fact there was nothing 
she could do under the circumstances other than eventually file this lawsuit. 
3. That your affiant believes that the conduct of the above-mentioned 
defendants "lulled" her into thinking that they would resolve the matter when they would not 
and did not. and if the Court invokes a "reasonable time" period after the conversion and 
notice of conversion, such a period should be tolled or extended by virtue of the 
misconduct of the above-named defendants — certainly not by any conduct on your 
affiant's part. That less than 90 days after the alleged date of conversion is a "reasonable 
time" in this case because your affiant acted reasonably during all that period and she does 
not know how it is possible that she could have acted more reasonably or diligently. That 
your affiant believes that no reasonable person in her shoes would have acted any 
differently and certainly no one. under the same circumstances, would have thought that he 
or she had an independent duty to effect "cover" and buy replacement stock, especially 
when no defendant informed your affiant of such and such only became an issue after this 
- 2 -
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case was filed. That your affiant believes that no reasonable person would have spent 
several thousand dollars of his or her own money buying replacement stock when any such 
person, and your affiant in particular, is the sole victim of the gross negligence, 
malfeasance, misfeasance, and overall intentional conduct of the defendants. 
4. Because your affiant acted reasonably and the culpable defendants did not, 
a "reasonable time" after the conversion and notice of conversion should include a time 
period up to and until July end/August beginning 1988 when the price of Check Rite stock 
admittedly attained its highest price of $1-5/16th per share. 
5. Lastly, your affiant should add that during one conversation with 
Guardalabene, Guardalabene tried to get your affiant to deal directly with Fletcher to 
resolve the problem. Your affiant responded that she did not think such was her 
responsibility. At that point, Guardalabene informed your affiant that because she was a 
"layman" and apparently didn't understand the situation, she should get a lawyer. Your 
affiant then understood Guardalabene to say that he would no longer deal with her directly 
until she consulted with legal counsel and had him talk directly to Guardalabene. Your 
affiant can attest that after she retained counsel, who in fact tried to negotiate 
unsuccessfully with Guardalabene, Guardalabene was still unwilling to resolve the problem 
and therefore, Guardalabene caused your affiant to incur unwarranted and unjustified 
attorney fees, not only prior to filing suit, but thereafter as well. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this/Jptay of February, 1990. 
- 3 -
GOl 
My Commission Expires: 
B:AFDVT.9 ' 
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EXHIBIT "5" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k /a CARDINAL 
ENERGY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHUCK BURTON 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF COLO. ) CoU> <lffOO 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF ) ' ^EIHU&Z 
Chuck Burton, on his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein. 
That during July and August 1988 your affiant was employed as an account executive with 
^•towaSwawokri, a securities broker-dealer in Denver, Colorado. 
2. That during the time your affiant was an account executive with^fober J-=*sT 
Fjnannial, it made a "market" in the stock of Check Rite International, Inc. 
3. That your affiant recalls a conversation he had with Plaintiff LeAnna 
Broadwater some time in July 1988 in which she sought a quote on the stock of Check Rite. 
4. That your affiant specifically recalls a transaction at Kober Financial in ((7& 
which a sale of Check Rite stock occurred at $1 3/8 per share, exclusive of commissions. 
5. That your affiant blieves and recalls that such transaction occurred at July 
1988 end or early August 1988 and such was soon after your affiant's telephone 
conversation with Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this J8_day ofWgguat, 1989. 
^ppraii flacks 
. 'MM f§uc ^ _ 
uck Burton H X 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thislSth day of /^§ttSt, 1989. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Denver, Colorado 
My Commission Expires: <$T7rTZ: <SF CoO*MDo 
11 [2. /*? GOOIJIV OP A^fPnoe-
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EXHIBIT "6" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah, NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE, 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation, CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k /a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF 
PENNY G. GRACE 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Attached hereto in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counts I and II of her Amended Complaint is the Affidavit of Penny G. Grace, Assistant Vice 
President of Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. 
r' -
V j j y 
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/M^WONSECURfTlES INC. 
333 CHESTERFIELD CENTER BLDG., SUITE 100, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI 63017 314 532-2400 
August 8, 1989 
Mr. Michael Coombs 
72 East-400 South 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Coombs: 
In regard to your inquiry on the Checkrite stock, I can 
attest to the fact that I have been purchasing Checkrite 
stock for clients since September 17, 1987. I have 
purchased these shares for clients at various prices. The 
highest price I paid for the stock was at 1-5/16 on 
July 28, 1988 when I purchased 20,000 shares of Checkrite 
for various clients. 
I have enclosed my business card. Please let me know if 
I can be of further assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
Penny G. Grace 
Asst. Vice President 
PGG/kk 
STATE OF /tfsifiur; 
COUNTY OF 5TJ-Cu>S 
PENNY GRACE BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND SAYS THAT SHE PERSONALLY 
APPEARED BEFORE ME AND SWORE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT ON THIS 
£ZL DAY OF J'jf , 1 9 ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSIONS EXPIRES A^iy ^f /<?<?/) 
00383 
EXHIBIT "7" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC.. f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF POTTER 
INVESTMENT COMPANY 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
George "John" Potter, being first put on his oath deposes and says as follows 
on behalf of Potter Investment Company: 
1. That your affiant is a principal of the securities brokerage firm here in Salt 
Lake City known as Potter Investment Company. That your affiant has power and authority 
- 1 -
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to make this affidavit on behalf of Potter Investment Company. That since the 1950's your 
affiant has been in the securities brokerage business and he has been a registered 
representative with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD") and the 
Utah Securities Division. That he has personal knowledge and experience as to that which is 
contained herein. 
2. That Potter Investment Company bought certificate 258 from defendant 
Scott J. Fletcher and sold the same to plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater. That such certificate 
was properly endorsed by Fletcher and properly signature guaranteed as required in the 
industry. In the industry such a certificate is known as "street stock" and it was delivered to 
and accepted by plaintiff Broadwater on the settlement date of her purchase transaction 
with Potter Investment Company. That because Potter Investment Company received 
valuable consideration from Ms. Broadwater for her purchase of 8,000 shares of Check 
Rite, Potter Investment Company has and would have had no dispute as to whether Ms. 
Broadwater then became the true and lawful owner of certificate 258. 
3. That sometime in mid-1988, Potter Investment Company learned about 
plaintiff's problem with respect to her request of Atlas Stock Transfer, Check Rite's 
transfer agent, to transfer and register Check Rite certificate 258 into her name. 
4. That sometime in the end of June or the first week of July 1988 your affiant 
recalls engaging in a telephone conversation with an individual who identified himself as 
Paul S. Guardalabene and who further identified himself as an employee or agent of Old 
Republic Surety, the insurance company that had written a lost instrument bond on Check 
Rite certificate 258. That your affiant had a lengthy discussion with Mr. Guardalabene 
about penny stocks and lost instrument bonds, etc., one that lasted probably at least 30 
- 2 -
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minutes or more. That during such conversation with Mr. Guardalabene, your affiant 
informed Mr. Guardalabene that penny stocks such as Check Rite were highly volatile and it 
was your affiant's suggestion to Mr. Guardalabene that it would be in Guardalabene's best 
interest to quickly resolve any dispute with plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater as the stock could 
appreciate in value. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 1990. 
Georde "Johnjf Patter 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
residing at Salt Lake City. UT 
AFDVT. 
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EXHIBIT "8" 
1 '. U s. V 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. No. 3639 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
72 East 400 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 359-0833 
TL3 
U i - u ~ 
••.' -r. ?'\ •CP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
LeANNA BROADWATER. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin 
corporation doing business in 
Utah. NORTH WESTERN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF MILWAUKEE. 
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin 
corporation, doing business in 
Utah. ATLAS STOCK TRANSFER, a 
Utah Corporation. CHECK RITE 
INTERNATIONAL INC., f /k/a 
CARDINAL ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and SCOTT J. 
FLETCHER, a Utah resident. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNEST MUTH 
Civil No. 89-0902684-CV 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Ernest Muth on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant is a stock broker employed by Bagley Securities, Inc., and 
for several years he has been a registered representative with the National Association of 
- 1 -
Securities Dealers. Inc.. ("NASD") and the Utah Securities Division. That he has persona) 
knowledge and experience as to that which is contained herein. 
2. That your affiant's firm, Bagley Securities, Inc., undertook transactions in 
the securities of Check-Rite from«May through August, 1988. That based on official 
records in the possession of Bagley Securities which your affiant has examined, the 
following is a list of the highest prices that the stock of Check-Rite was either bought or 
sold by Bagley Securities for the period(s) so indicated: 
MAY, 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
JUNE. 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
JULY. 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK: 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
HIGHEST 
p, PRICE 
• *J_ 
.'bO 
Jto. 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
-Jta 1 ^ : $1.25 
AUGUST, 1988: 
FIRST WEEK: 
SECOND WEEK: 
HIGHEST 
PRICE 
Mo !**•£> 
THIRD WEEK: 
FOURTH WEEK UP TVAP&7 
3. To your affiant's best knowledge and belief, the highest price that the stock 
traded in Salt Lake City in 1988 was $1.25 per share as evidenced by Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference, a true and correct copy of a Bagley Securities stock 
confirmation. 
4. That Plaintiff LeAnna Broadwater has a brokerage account with your affiant 
and during the latter part of July and the beginning of August, 1988, your affiant was in 
regular communication with her about the price of Check Rite stock. That your affiant 
believes and is informed that if Ms. Broadwater had had a certificate of Check Rite to 
deliver, she would have sold it during the end of July or early August, 1988 when the price of 
the Company's stock achieved its highest price in 1988. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this"Z.\ day of January. 1990. 
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